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Abstract
What is called “orthodox” quantum mechanics, as presented in stan-
dard foundational discussions, relies on two substantive assumptions —
the projection postulate and the eigenvalue-eigenvector link — that do
not in fact play any part in practical applications of quantum mechan-
ics. I argue for this conclusion on a number of grounds, but primarily
on the grounds that the projection postulate fails correctly to account for
repeated, continuous and unsharp measurements (all of which are stan-
dard in contemporary physics) and that the eigenvalue-eigenvector link
implies that virtually all interesting properties are maximally indefinite
pretty much always. I present an alternative way of conceptualising quan-
tum mechanics that does a better job of representing quantum mechanics
as it is actually used, and in particular that eliminates use of either the
projection postulate or the eigenvalue-eigenvector link, and I reformulate
the measurement problem within this new presentation of orthodoxy.
1 Introduction: the orthodox view of orthodoxy
“Orthodox” or “standard” quantum mechanics, as typically presented in text-
book philosophy-of-physics discussions1, consists of these components:
The structural core: This has three parts:
1. States: The possible states of a quantum system are represented by
normalised vectors in some complex Hilbert space.
2. Observables: To any physical quantity used to describe the system
(often called an ‘observable’) is associated a self-adjoint operator on
that same Hilbert space.
3. Dynamics: The state of a quantum system evolves over time ac-
cording to the Schro¨dinger equation:
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 = − i
h¯
Ĥ |ψ(t)〉 (1)
where Ĥ is the self-adjoint operator corresponding to the system’s
energy.
1See, e. g. , Albert (1992), Barrett (1999), Bub (1997), Penrose (1989, ch.5–6)
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(This can be generalised in certain respects, in particular by allowing
quantum states to be mixed rather than pure, and in fact I think this gen-
eralisation does a better job of capturing real-world quantum mechanics
than the pure-state version (cf Wallace 2013) but for simplicity I use the
pure-state version in this paper.)
The Born (probability) rule : Suppose some quantity O has associated op-
erator Ô, which can be written
Ô =
∑
i
oiΠ̂(i) (2)
where the oi are the distinct eigenvalues of the operator and Π̂(i) projects
onto the subspace of states with eigenvalue oi. (Recall that any self-
adjoint operator can be so written — this is the ‘spectral resolution’ of
the operator.) Then if O is measured on a quantum system with state
|ψ〉, then:
1. The only possible outcomes of the measurement are the eigenvalues
oi of the operator;
2. The probability of the measurement giving result oi is
Pr(O = oi) = 〈ψ| P̂ (i) |ψ〉 . (3)
The projection postulate (aka the collapse law): Suppose some quantity
O, as above, is measured on a quantum system in state |ψ〉. Then the
measurement induces a stochastic transition on the state, so that:
1. Immediately after the measurement, the system is in one of the states
|ψi〉 = Π̂(i) |ψ〉‖Π̂(i) |ψ〉 ‖ . (4)
2. The probability that the system transitions into state |ψi〉 is given
by
Pr(|ψ〉 → |ψi〉) = 〈ψ| P̂ (i) |ψ〉 . (5)
(The projection law thus restricts the generality of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion: systems evolve under it only when a measurement is not taking
place.)
The eigenvector-eigenvalue link (E-E link): Given an quantityO as above:
1. A system in state |ψ〉 possesses a definite value of O if and only if
|ψ〉 is an eigenstate of Ô, Ô |ψ〉 = oi |ψ〉.
2. In this case, the definite value is the associated eigenvalue oi.
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Given one additional assumption — that if a measurement of O returns value oi,
the measured system actually has value oi of O — the Born rule can be derived
from the projection postulate and the eigenvalue-eigenvector link. For if O is
measured on a system in state |ψ〉, by the projection postulate it will transition
into an eigenstate of Ô, with the probability of transitioning given by (5); after
the collapse, it will have a definite value of O by the eigenvalue-eigenvector link;
if measurement simply reports that definite value, the Born rule follows.
In any case, it is standard in foundations of quantum mechanics to treat both
the projection postulate and the E-E link as core components of orthodox QM.
Interpretations of QM like Everett’s and Bohm’s, for instance, are specifically
described as ‘no-collapse’ interpretations in view of the fact that they drop the
collapse law from the postulates of QM; discussions of the ontology of the GRW
collapse theory Albert and Loewer (1996) talk of the need to abandon the E-E
link; attempts at interpretation-neutral discussions of the ontology of QM (e. g. ,
Skow 2010; Darby 2010; Bokulich 2014; Wolff 2015; Wilson 2016) typically take
the E-E link as a starting point.
Furthermore, typical statements of the quantum measurement problem typ-
ically take the E-E link, and/or the projection postulate, as central. The mea-
surement problem is the problem of macroscopic indefiniteness, of quantum
states that describe macroscopic systems in states that are indefinite with re-
gard to ordinary properties such as the location of pointers or the heartbeats
of cats. Or — if macroscopic indefiniteness is to be removed via the projection
postulate — it is the problem of dynamical ill-definedness, of the lack of any
well-defined recipe as to when collapse occurs (it is easy to show that collapse
cannot be a consequence or special case of the Schro¨dinger equation applied to
a complex measuring system).
The purpose of this paper, by contrast, is to argue that orthodox quantum
mechanics in fact consists only of the structural core and the Born rule. The
projection postulate, and the eigenvector-eigenvalue link, are at best parts of a
proposed interpretation of QM that goes beyond orthodoxy, at worst unmoti-
vated distractions. As such, in formulating (as opposed to solving) the quantum
measurement problem, we should begin with just the structural core and the
Born rule. We might introduce one or both as part of a solution to the measure-
ment problem, but we confuse the dialectic by taking them as initial common
ground.
To be clear what I mean: I will not (here) argue that the best or right
way to interpret QM, or to solve the quantum measurement problem, involves
abandoning collapse and/or the E-E link. I will argue that QM as actually
practiced by physicists — and what does “orthodox” QM mean, if not that? —
already proceeds without either.
In section 2 I provide some evidence that physicists in practice do not seem
to make use of a collapse rule. I strengthen this in sections 3–4 by arguing that
the collapse rule is incapable of handling two standard kinds of experimental
setup: those involving repeated measurements, and those involving continuous
observation. In section 6 I point out that the rapid spreading of wavepackets
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under the Schro¨dinger equation means that the E-E link makes the ridiculous
claim that essentially any system, including macroscopic systems, is maximally
indefinite in position, and hence that the E-E link does not have the resources
to say when systems are actually localised; in section 7 I deploy a result of
Hegerfeldt to show that this generalises to pretty much any observable.
For the remainder of the paper, I explore what ‘orthodox quantum mechan-
ics’ is, shorn of the E-E link and the projection postulate. (This part of the
paper draws on some parts of Wallace (2016), albeit deployed in a rather dif-
ferent context). I consider (in section 8) a view which treats preparation and
measurement as primitive, but ultimately reject it (in section 9) on the grounds
both that it too struggles with continuous and repeated measurements, and that
it cannot handle applications of QM where results from QM are integrated into
larger pieces of historical science. With this as a starting point, I finally sug-
gest (section 10) that orthodoxy should be understood as an inchoate attitude
to the quantum state, where its dynamics are always unitary but where it is
interpreted either as physically representational or as probabilistic, according
to context. In the concluding section I reflect on the right formulation of the
measurement problem given this conception of what ‘orthodox QM’ actually is.
2 Against collapse: indirect evidence
The projection postulate appears in Dirac (1930) and von Neumann (1955), the
first two codifications of the axioms of QM. It continues to be widespread,
though not universal, in first courses on QM to this day: an unscientific perusal
of my shelf reveals that collapse is included in about half of the books there that
present QM from scratch. (The Born rule, of course, appears in all of them.)
But for all this (I will argue) it plays no real role in applications of quantum
mechanics in physics. It is rather hard to prove a negative, but here I give some
suggestive reasons to think that physical practice abjures collapse.
Firstly, collapse is conspicuously absent from second courses in QM, and
in particular in courses on relativistic QM. This ought to strike a student as
peculiar (it certainly struck the author, as an undergraduate, as peculiar): col-
lapse, as formally defined in QM, is a global phenomenon, applying to the whole
quantum state and so affecting, simultaneously, systems spatially far from one
another. In relativity, this notion of simultaneity is frame-dependent (or simply
meaningless, depending how you think about conventionality of simultaneity,
but in any case problematic). One would expect, if collapse is really part of or-
thodox QM, that the first chapter of any relativistic QM textbook would start
with a careful discussion of exactly how the collapse postulate is to be applied
in the relativistic context. I have not once seen any such textbook so much as
consider the question.
Again, to be clear: the point is not that collapse is unsatisfactory in the
relativistic regime. Of course it is; the tension between relativity and QM has
been known at least since the EPR paper (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935).
But relativistic QM textbooks contain, not an unsatisfactory collapse rule, but
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no collapse rule at all. One concludes that the theory must be applicable without
any mention of collapse. And indeed it is: the name of the game in relativistic
QM is to calculate probablility distributions over physical quantities — most
often, over the various energies, momenta and particle numbers of the decay
products of some scattering experiment — and for this, only the Born rule is
required; collapse plays no part.
Secondly, the theoretical physics community has been worrying for forty
years about the so-called “black hole information loss paradox” originally identi-
fied by Hawking (1976). (See, e. g. , Page (1994), Belot, Earman, and Ruetsche (1999)
and references therein, though the debate continues in lively fashion to this day.)
At its heart, the paradox is simply that black hole decay is non-unitary and as
such can’t be described within the Schro¨dinger-equation framework. But state-
vector collapse is also non-unitary! So if the collapse law is part of orthodox
QM, quantum-mechanical dynamics were never unitary in the first place: they
were an alternating series of unitary and non-unitary processes. So why be so
desparate to preserve unitary in the exotic regime of black hole decay, when it
is ubiquitous in far more mundane cases? One has the clear impression that
(at least this part of) the theoretical physics community does not in fact think
that dynamics is non-unitary in any other contexts in physics, rendering black
hole decay uniquely problematic. Tempting though it might be for this advo-
cate of the Everett interpretation to claim that the community has adopted the
many-worlds theory en masse, a more mundane account is simply that (what
they regard as) orthodox QM does not include the collapse postulate.2
Thirdly, modern quantum field theory largely abandons Hamiltonian meth-
ods in favour of the path-integral approach. But in that approach it is not
even clear how collapse is to be defined (and, again, textbook presentations
never seem to mention the issue), and yet the theory still seems to produce
empirically successful predictions.
Finally, and as an admittedly crude indicator, searching the archives of Phys-
ical Review for projection postulate, wave-function collapse and the like turns
up only a few hundred references, nearly all of which turn out to be (a) founda-
tional discussions, (b) discussions of proposed alternatives to quantum theory,
or (c) theoretical quantum-computation discussions. (For comparison, searches
for terms like state vector or Hilbert space or Schrodinger equation typically
turn up several tens of thousands of references.)
3 Against collapse: inadequacy for repeated mea-
surements
The case of repeated measurements — when some quantity is measured on a
quantum system and then, a short while later, measured again — has actually
2Of course, plenty of people working on black hole decay are fairly explicit advocates of
the Everett interpretation, and I have argued elsewhere that quantum cosmology generally
is tacitly committed to the Everett interpretation, but it’s clear that the majority of the
community embrace Mermin’s “shut up and calculate” approach (Mermin 2004).
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been used, since Dirac, as an argument for state-vector collapse. The argu-
ment goes like this: repeated measurements must give identical results; so if a
measurement of O gives outcome oi, then a subsequent measurement of O im-
mediately afterwards must also give outcome oi, The only way this is compatible
with the Born rule is if the state of the system immediately before this second
measurement is an eigenstate of Ô with eigenvalue oi — so to get repeated
measurements right, wavefunction collapse is a requirement.
. . . which would be all very well, if repeated measurements did give identical
results. But:
• photon detectors typically absorb photons: immediately after a measure-
ment on a photon, the photon no longer exists;
• The Stern-Gerlach apparatus detects an atom’s spin by slamming it very
hard into a screen; this process is in no way guaranteed to preserve that
atom’s spin.
• More generally, measuring something by slamming it very hard into some-
thing else is probably the single most commonly used tool in the experi-
mental physicist’s toolbox.
In fact, ‘non-disturbing’ measurements, in which repeated measurements indeed
give the same results, are decidedly uncommon in quantum mechanics and re-
quire some skill to set up (see Home and Whitaker (1997) for discussion). So a
collapse rule explicitly designed to ensure that repeated measurements give the
same results is in flat conflict with a lot of observed physics.
By contrast, quantum mechanics without collapse has no trouble with re-
peated measurements — non-disturbing or otherwise. The familiar trick, follow-
ing von Neumann’s original prescription, is to include the measurement device
in the physical analysis. Suppose for simplicity that Ô is non degenerate,
Ô =
∑
i
oi |oi〉 〈oi| , (6)
and suppose that the measurement device has some observableM corresponding
to the possible measurement outcomes. In von Neumann’s original version, M
is the position of the centre of mass of some pointer; here for convenience I take
M̂ too as being discrete and nondegenerate,
M̂ =
∑
i
mi |mi〉 〈mi| . (7)
Then the measurement interaction is assumed to have form
|oi〉⊗|m0〉 → |ϕi〉⊗|mi〉 . (8)
Applying this measurement process to a system initially in state
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
λi |oi〉 (9)
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and a measurement device initially in state |m0〉 gives the outcome
|ψ〉⊗|m0〉 →
∑
i
λi |ϕi〉⊗|mi〉 . (10)
Applying the Born rule to a measurement of M now tells us that the probability
of getting mi is |λi|2 — exactly what the Born rule requires for a measurement
of O on the original system, and it is for exactly this reason that this process
indeed qualifies as a measurement.
There is no requirement here that |ϕi〉 = |oi〉 or even that the distinct |ϕi〉
are orthogonal — indeed, the measurement process could perfectly well dump
the measured system in some fixed post-measurement state |ϕ0〉 (as in the case
of photon absorption) in which case the measurement process is
|ψ〉⊗|m0〉 → |ϕ0〉 ⊗
∑
i
λi |mi〉 . (11)
The ‘non-disturbing’ measurements are then the ones where indeed |ϕi〉 = |oi〉.
In these cases, but only these, if we bring in a second copy of the measurement
device and repeat the measurement interaction, we get
|ψ〉⊗|m0〉⊗|m0〉 →
(∑
i
λi |oi〉⊗|mi〉
)
⊗ |m0〉 →
∑
i
λi |oi〉⊗|mi〉⊗|mi〉 . (12)
Applying the Born rule in this case to a joint measurement of M ×M , we find
that indeed, when measurements are non-disturbing the probability is 100%
that two successive measurements give the same result.
If there is a lesson to learn from repeated measurements it is that the Born
rule, by itself, does not define transition probabilities, but only probabilities at
an instant (an issue I return to in section 10). But “wave functions collapse on
measurement” does not solve this problem satisfactorily, and indeed gives flatly
incorrect results.
4 Against collapse: inadequacy for continuous
measurement
Continuous measurements — where a system is constantly observed to see if,
or how quickly, it undergoes some change — are commonplace in physics. For
instance, radioactive decay measurements — where a Geiger counter is placed
near some radioactive substance, and the rate of decay is recorded — are among
the most straightforward demonstrations of quantum mechanics’ probabilistic
nature. Yet they fit strikingly badly into the wavefunction-collapse framework.
It is not that the physics of (for instance) radioactive decay is problematic, at
least phenomenologically. (Actually calculating decay rates ab initio is another
matter: the nucleus is a complex and strongly bound system, and hard to treat
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analytically.) The idea is that — if the decay rate is 1/τ — then an undecayed
particle, in state |undecayed〉, evolves over some short time interval δt like
|undecayed〉 →
(
1− δt
2
2τ
)
|undecayed〉+
√
1
τ
δt |decay products〉 . (13)
Meanwhile, the decay-product state’s own evolution over time, which can be
represented as
|decay products〉 → Û(t) |decay products〉 ≡ |decay products;t〉 (14)
explores a very large region of Hilbert space and, in particular, satisfies
〈decay products|decay products;t〉 ≃ 0 (15)
for t0 < t < T , where T is the (extremely large) Poincare´ recurrence time for
the system and t0 ≪ τ (i. e. , the rate at which the radioactive products evolve
away from their original state is much quicker than the particle’s decay rate).
Under these assumptions we can deduce
Û(t) |undecayed〉 = e−t/2τ |undecayed〉+
∫ t
0
dξ
e−ξ/2τ√
τ
|decay products;(t− ξ)〉
(16)
at least for T ≫ t≫ τ .
Applying the Born rule to this system gives exactly the results we would
expect: at time t, the probability of the system being undecayed is |e−t/2τ |2 =
e−t/τ . And no assumption of wavefunction collapse is required to derive this
probability. But suppose we make that assumption anyway: when, in that case,
is the wavefunction supposed to collapse?
One possibility would be to model the continuous process of measurement
by a frequent but discrete series — applying the projection postulate every ∆
seconds — and then taking ∆ → 0. As long as ∆ is long enough — tech-
nically speaking: as long as ∆ ≫ t0 — this iterated collapse will leave the
probabilities unaffected. But it is the content of the quantum Zeno paradox
(Misra and Sudarshan 1977) that as ∆ → 0, the evolution of the system is en-
tirely halted: in this limit, the state of the particle remains |undecayed〉 forever.
Misra and Sudarshan did assume (at least for the purposes of their paper)
that observation required collapse, and so that continuous observation required
continuous collapse; hence “paradox”. But it is the collapse postulate, not any-
thing about continuous observation per se, that delivers this impossible result.
Modelling of measurement as a physical process, as per the previous section,
reveals (cf Home and Whitaker 1997) that:
• The Zeno ‘paradox’ is a real (and empirically confirmed) physical effect:
if a discrete measurement process is carried out repeatedly (and, crucially,
if the time taken to carry out every individual measurement is short com-
pared to the timescales on which the measured system evolves), then the
rate of evolution of the system really is reduced by the measurements, and
tends to zero as the frequency of repetition tends to infinity.
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• A continuous observation can also be modelled as a physical process, and
in this case the relevant variable is the response speed of the measurement
device compared to the timescale on which the measured system evolves.
Again, when the former is much faster than the latter, evolution is heavily
suppressed. But an observation can be ‘continuous’ even while its response
time is relatively slow: in the case of a Geiger counter, the response time
is so slow compared to the evolution timescales of decay that Zeno slowing
is negligible. (The relevant system timescale is not the decay rate, but the
evolution time of the decay products, i.e. t0.)
(This is not to say that the Zeno effect is entirely non-paradoxical, even when
understood without the distorting reference to collapse. Paradoxical (though
non-contradictory) consequences arise when the measurement process involves
energy exchange between measurement device and system only when the system
is in a state distinct from its original state, so that the presence of the measure-
ment device appears to halt the system’s evolution even though the two are not
interacting. This is related to the phenomenon of interaction-free measurement,
as seen in the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb problem Elitzur and Vaidman (1993). For
further discussion see Home and Whitaker, ibid, or (for an unapologetically pro-
Everettian perspective!) Wallace (2012, pp.390–3).)
5 Against collapse: inadequacy for unsharp mea-
surement
The view that measurements are represented by collections of mutually orthog-
onal projectors is now thirty years out of date. Quantum measurement the-
ory now regards the “projection-valued measurements” (PVMs) that can be so
represented merely as a special case of a more general framework: “positive-
operator-valued measurements” (POVMs).3 In the POVM framework, mea-
surements are represented by collections {M̂ i} of self-adjoint operators that
(i) are positive (that is, have no negative eigenvalues, or equivalently, satisfy
〈ψ| M̂ i |ψ〉 ≥ 0 for any state |ψ〉); (ii) sum to unity,
∑
i M̂ i = 1̂.
For instance, consider measuring a particle’s phase-space position: that is,
consider simultaneously measuring its position and its momentum. Within the
PVM framework, this is impossible: position and momentum do not commute.
But in modern measurement theory, this simply tells us that we cannot make a
simultaneous sharp measurement of position and momentum. We can measure
both provided we are prepared to accept a little noise in the measurement pro-
cess, and for macroscopically large systems the noise can be very small indeed —
which is reassuring, since manifestly we do simultaneously measure the position
and momentum of macroscopic bodies.
A phase-space POVM (in, for simplicity, one spatial dimension) can be de-
fined by starting with some state |ϕ〉 that is a wavepacket approximately lo-
3For more detail on the physics of this section, see, e. g. ,
Busch, Lahti, and Mittelstaedt (1996).
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calised around position and momentum zero (say, a Gaussian), so that
|ϕ(p, q)〉 = exp (−iX̂p) exp (+iP̂ q) |ϕ〉 (17)
is the same state translated so as to be localised around position q and momen-
tum p. Then the family of operators
M̂p,q =
1
2pi
|ϕ(p, q)〉 〈ϕ(p, q)| (18)
is a POVM and can be used to represent the unsharp phase-space measurement.
It will give probability distributions over position and momenta separately which
are smearings-out of the sharp results obtained from the Born rule, with the
level of smearing depending on the width of the wavepacket in position and
momentum space and becoming negligible in both cases for macroscopically
large systems.
Similarly, the POVM framework can handle fuzzy measurements of a single
quantity, as might be appropriate when the measurement device is imperfect.
Given an observable O corresponding to an operator Ô with spectral resolution
(2), suppose that f1, . . . fN are N functions from the spectrum of Ô to the
nonnegative reals, satisfying
N∑
k=1
fk(oi) = 1 (19)
for all i. Then the family of operators fk(Ô) is a POVM. If fk(oi) = δ
k
i , this
just reduces to a sharp measurement of O, but more general measurements of
O can be represented by more general choices of the fk.
The POVM generalisation of traditional measurement theory is by now rou-
tine, and mathematically speaking is a straightforward generalisation of the
Born rule. But it has no associated collapse law, and so it is opaque how to
apply collapse in POVM contexts. In addition, POVMs are not associated with
the spectral decompositions of the operators representing physical quantities,
so to deduce what POVM is being applied, we need to model the measurement
process as a unitary interaction with the measurement device, and then in due
course apply the Born rule with respect to a macroscopic quantity pertinent to
the measurement device.
The lessons of continuous, repeated and unsharp measurements are the same:
in any measurement processes more complicated than a simple, non-repeated
discrete measurement, reliably getting the physics right requires treating the
system’s behaviour unitarily, and if necessary physically modelling the measure-
ment process. Collapse is at best an unreliable shorthand. And of course, it is
only in “measurement processes more complicated than a simple, non-repeated
discrete measurement” that the collapse rule could play any role in physical
practice anyway. If we measure the system once and immediately discard it, the
Born rule is all we need.
I conclude that the collapse postulate plays, and can play, no real part in
actual applications of quantum mechanics.
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6 Against the eigenvalue-eigenvector link: prob-
lems for position
Consider a mass-m point particle — either a fundamental particle, or, more typ-
ically, the centre-of-mass degree of freedom of some rigid body like a dust mote
or a table. Restricting it, for simplicity, to one dimension, its most significant
observables are position and momentum, corresponding to operators X̂ and P̂
respectively, obeying the commutation relation
[
X̂, P̂
]
= ih¯.
It is a standard result of quantum mechanics4 that:
• X̂ and P̂ have continuous spectra (reflecting the fact that these are not
quantised quantities, that any position or momentum is a possible result
of a measurement), and can be expressed as
X̂ =
∫ +∞
−∞
dxx |x〉 〈x| and P̂ = h¯
∫ +∞
−∞
dk k |k〉 〈k| . (20)
• Any quantum state can be expressed in the position basis as
|ψ〉 =
∫ +∞
−∞
dx |x〉 〈x|ψ〉 ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
dxψ(x) |x〉 (21)
where ψ(x) ≡ 〈x|ψ〉 is the position-space wavefunction (or often just wave-
function) of the state.
• Similarly, any quantum state can be expressed in the momentum basis as
|ψ〉 =
∫ +∞
−∞
dk |k〉 〈k|ψ〉 ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
dk ψˆ(k) |k〉 (22)
where ψ(k) ≡ 〈k|ψ〉 is the momentum-space wavefunction of the state.
• The position and momentum bases are related by
|k〉 = 1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
dx eikx |x〉 (23)
from which it follows that the position and momentum representations are
Fourier transforms of one another:
ψˆ(k) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
dx e−ikxψ(x). (24)
Suppose we apply the E-E link to the position of the particle. For the particle
to definitely have position x, it would need to be an eigenstate of X̂ — that
4And, like most ‘standard results of quantum mechanics’, there are some tacit additional
mathematical assumptions required. See (Ruetsche 2011, ch.3) for details.
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is, it would need to be in state |x〉. That isn’t possible: because the spectrum
of the position operator is continuous, the eigenstates of position are so-called
‘improper eigenstates’ — at least as QM is normally used, they do not represent
an actually-attainable state of a quantum system. (‘Legal’ quantum states are
normalised — 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 — whereas the norm 〈x|x〉 is infinite, or at any rate
undefined.)
So: no system has a perfectly definite position. This is not in itself problem-
atic. It is a standard result of functional analysis that functions f(X̂) may be
defined by
f(X̂) =
∫ +∞
−∞
dx f(x) |x〉 〈x| . (25)
In particular, if Σ is some compact (i. e. , closed and bounded) subset of the real
numbers, and if ΛΣ is defined by
ΛΣ(x) = 1 if x ∈ Σ
= 0 otherwise (26)
(27)
— that is, if ΛΣ represents the property of being in Σ — then
ΛΣ(X̂) =
∫
Σ
|x〉 〈x| (28)
projects, according to the E-E link, onto all and only those states which are
definitely located in Σ. In the position representation, this is all and only
states whose wavefunction vanishes outside Σ. This suggests that if we want
to represent a reasonably-well-localised particle, we should choose one with a
wavefunction confined to some reasonably small Σ. (And similarly mutatis
mutandis if we want to consider systems localised in momentum.)
The first thing to say about this is that it is not how physicists in fact
represent localised particles. The standard strategy in physics is to represent a
particle localised at some point x0 by a Gaussian, i. e. a state with wavefunction
ψ(x) = N exp(−(x− x0)2/2L2). (29)
ψ(x) is very small when |x − x0|/L ≫ 1, so a state like this, if its position is
measured, is nearly certain to be found within a few multiples of L from x0
— L is the “effective width” of the state, the size of the region in which it is
‘effectively localised’ in physics parlance. But ψ(x) 6= 0 for every value of x
there is — so according to the E-E link, the particle is completely delocalised,
no matter how small L might be.
Perhaps not too much should be made of this. Physicists use Gaussians
because they are mathematically very convenient, rather than from some deep
commitment to what ‘true’ localisation is like. Perhaps we should think of the
Gaussian as just a very convenient approximation to a ‘really’ localised state,
with the latter having a wavefunction with genuinely compact support.
12
But suppose that a quantum system, at some initial time, does have such a
wavefunction — say, ψ0, which is localised inside some compact region Σ. If we
represent that same system instead in the momentum-space representation —
that is, with its momentum-space wavefunction, which is the Fourier transform
ψˆ of ψ — then we find that ψˆ does not itself have compact support. (This is a
consequence of the classical Paley-Wiener theorem,5 which says inter alia that
the Fourier transform of a compactly supported L2 function is holomorphic.)
Via the E−E link, this tells us that any particle whose position is not completely
indefinite has a completely indefinite momentum.
That might itself be worrying: we might have hoped, given the uncertainty
principle, that a particle could definitely have both (a) a position within some
region of width L and (b) a momentum within some region of width h¯/L, but we
won’t get that from the E−E link. But worse is to come: for consider the time
evolution of this system. We might expect that a particle whose momentum is
completely indefinite will spread out instantaneously over all of space — and
indeed, this is exactly what happens. Even ‘confining’ the system inside some
potential well will not prevent its spreading out, for a quantum system will
‘tunnel’ through any potential barrier unless it is infinite, and so unphysical.
So: no body can be localised to any degree at all for more than an instant,
at least on the E-E definition of ‘localised’. (I have argued for this on intuitive
physical grounds but will supply a mathematical proof in the next section). No
assumption about the ‘microscopic’ nature of the body in question has been
made: the argument applies as readily to chairs, tables and planets as to elec-
trons or atoms, and so chairs, tables and planets, according to the E-E link,
have at almost all times a completely indefinite location. If we assume the pro-
jection postulate, of course, a system is localised immediately after a position
measurement — but the operative word is ‘immediately’. An arbitrarily short
time after the measurement, delocalisation is complete.
I conclude that the E-E link is of no use in understanding what it really is
for a physical system to be localised to any degree.6 A fortiori, it cannot be
being used in physics to do useful work in our understanding of localisation. As
we shall see, this is not a feature unique to spatial localisation.
7 Against the eigenvector-eigenvalue link: prob-
lems for basically any quantity
Hegerfeldt’s theorem (Hegerfeldt 1998a; Hegerfeldt 1998b) is as follows:
Hegerfeldt’s theorem: Suppose that the spectrum of the Hamil-
tonian of some quantum system is bounded below (something that
5See, e. g. , Rudin (1991, pp.196-202).
6The line of argument here has some resemblance to that used by Albert and Loewer (1996)
to argue that the E-E link should be rejected in the GRW theory in place of a “fuzzy link”.
But Albert and Loewer attributed the problem to the Gaussian collapse function used in the
GRW theory, whereas as we have seen, the problem arises even in the absence of any collapse
event, as a consequence of ordinary Schro¨dinger dynamics.
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holds of essentially any physically reasonable Hamiltonian) and let
|ψ(t)〉 be some dynamical history of that system (i. e. , some solution
to the Schro¨dinger equation). Then if Π̂ is any projection operator7,
exactly one of the following holds:
1. 〈ψ(t)| Π̂ |ψ(t)〉 6= 0 for all times t except for some nowhere dense
set of times of measure zero (i. e. , for all times except some set
of isolated instants);
2. 〈ψ(t)| Π̂ |ψ(t)〉 = 0 for all times t.
Hegerfeldt proved the theorem as part of an investigation into localisation in
relativistic quantum mechanics8 but in fact it causes severe difficulties for the
E-E link in general. For consider again our operator
Ô =
∑
i
oiΠ̂i (30)
(which includes, as a special case, the sort of discretisations of position we
considered previously.) The observable O corresponding to Ô will according
to the E-E link, definitely not have value oi with respect to state |ψ(t)〉 iff
〈ψ(t)| Π̂i |ψ(t)〉 = 0. So Hegerfeldt’s theorem can be rephrased as
Hegerfeldt’s theorem (indefiniteness form): Given a system
evolving unitarily over some interval of time under a Hamiltonian
whose spectrum is bounded below, a given property is either (a)
definitely not possessed at every time in that interval, or (b) not
definitely not possessed at almost every time in that interval.
Put another way: suppose there is some property that, at some time in the
indefinitely distant future, the system might have some probability to be found
to possess. Then, according to the E-E link, it is immediately — that is, within
an arbitrarily short window of time — indefinite whether the system has that
property.
Put yet another way: anything that might at some future point be indefinite
will be indefinite immediately. This seems to render the E-E link fairly useless
as a description of ontology. We might have imagined that systems begin having
some definite value of a given quantity, then gradually evolve so as to be indefi-
nite across several values of that quantity, and in due course become completely
indefinite with respect to that quantity (perhaps until some wavefunction col-
lapse restores definiteness). But dynamically, that can’t happen: indefiniteness
is immediate if it is going to happen at all.
(I should, in fairness, acknowledge one context in which we seem to be able
to get some content out of the E-E link even given Hegerfeldt’s theorem. In the
specific case of angular momentum (including both orbital angular momentum
of some bound system, and the intrinsic spin of a particle), we could imagine
7In fact, it suffices for Π̂ to be a positive operator.
8See Halvorson and Clifton (2002) for discussion of its significance in this context.
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the angular momentum precessing, so that the state at time t is an eigenstate
of angular momentum with respect to some angle Ω(t). The system would then
at all times have a definite angular momentum even though it would only be
definite for an instant with respect to angular momentum in a given direction.
But this relies on special features of the angular-momentum case, in particular
does not generalise to position and momentum, and looks highly likely to be
unstable once angular momentum couples to other degrees of freedom.)
To push the consequences of Hegerfeldt’s theorem further (and also pro-
vide a rigorous justification of the claims of the previous section), suppose
〈ψ(t)| Π̂ |ψ(t)〉 = 0 for all t, and consider
S = Span{|ψ(t)〉}. (31)
S is time invariant, and so must be spanned by (possibly improper) eigenstates
of the Hamiltonian. And of course any element of S is an eigenstate of Π̂ with
eigenvalue 0. So we can conclude that:
Complete indefiniteness corollary: Unless some operator has
some (possibly improper) eigenstates in common with the Hamilto-
nian, its associated quantity is completely indefinite at almost every
time.
(Readers uncomfortable with my casual use of improper eigenstates
can just rephrase the requirement as “Ô has an eigensubspace in-
variant under the Hamiltonian”.)
As an application of this result, suppose that the Hamiltonian is non-degenerate
(that is: has no two eigenstates with the same eigenvalue). Then a necessary and
sufficient condition for a quantity not to be almost always completely indefinite
is that it is a function of the Hamiltonian.
As another, consider some collection of scalar particles interacting via some
potential:
Ĥ =
∑
i
P̂
2
i
2mi
+ V (X̂1, . . . X̂n), (32)
for some smooth function V . In every case I know, and in particular in the
case of free particles, the eigenfunctions of this Hamiltonian have only isolated
zeroes. (This is easily provable in the case where V is a polynomial or other
holomorphic function, so that the eigenfunctions themselves are holomorphic;
it also follows in one dimension from the uniqueness theorem for solutions of
ordinary differential equations.) But in that case, no eigenfunction has compact
support, so no projector onto localised states is time-invariant. It follows that
every particle has a completely indefinite position almost always.
The underlying problem here is a radical mismatch between the E-E link and
the way quantum mechanics actually handles the idea of a system’s becoming
more spread out (speaking loosely) with respect to a given quantity. QM handles
the latter through probabilities: the likelihood of a particle localised at x being
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found very far from x is initially negligibly small and only gradually increases —
and, depending on the dynamics, may never increase beyond negligible levels.
But the E-E link is all-or-nothing: as soon as the system has any probability,
even 10−10
20
, of being found in some region, it is completely indefinite whether
it is in that region.
I conclude that statements about a system’s properties that rely on the E-E
link convey essentially no information about a system between measurements
(and, at the instant of measurement, everything empirically salient is coded in
the Born rule in any case). As such, the E-E link cannot plausibly play a role
in orthodox QM.
8 Quantum mechanics in practice: the lab view
Neither the collapse rule nor the E-E link can be part of orthodox, i. e. actually-
used-in-practice, QM. It isn’t that they are ultimately unsatisfactory on philo-
sophical grounds, but rather that they are not even prima facie satisfactory,
and lead to nonsense (all systems maximally indefinite all the time) or violation
of empirical predictions (all measurements non-disturbing; continuous measure-
ment impossible to define without Zeno freezing).
So what do physicists do, if they don’t do “orthodox” QM as it is usually
understood? In the rest of the paper I shall consider two paradigms to describe
orthodox QM. The first — the “lab view” — is not uncommonly found in more
careful foundational discussions of QM in the physics literature (especially in
quantum information) but is not ultimately satisfactory to account for physical
practice; the second — the “decoherent view” — does, I think, provide an
adequate fit to physical practice.
In the Lab View (my presentation here is modelled on Peres (1993)), any ap-
plication of QM should be understood as applying to some experimental setup,
and that setup in turn is broken into three processes:
1. State preparation;
2. Dynamics;
3. State measurement.
The first and last of these are primitive: the question of how the system is
prepared in a given state, and how it is measured, are external to the experiment
and so not modelled in the physics. Only the second is regarded as a modelled
physical process.
In quantum mechanics, in particular:
1. The system is prepared in a state represented by some (pure or mixed)
Hilbert-space state;
2. It evolves under the Schro¨dinger equation for some fixed period of time;
3. The outcome of the measurement is given by the Born Rule.
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The Lab View itself does not force a unique interpretation of the underlying
physics, but it is often presented in parallel with a particular interpretation,
each of which is sometimes claimed as ‘orthodoxy’. Particularly prominent
examples include:
Straight operationalism: There is nothing more to quantum mechanics than
a calculus that connects preparation processes (conceived of macroscop-
ically and phenomenologically) to measurement processes (likewise con-
ceived of); physics neither needs, nor can accommodate, any microscopic
story linking the two.
Straight operationalism is perhaps the closest realisation in mainstream
physics of the old logical-positivist conception of the philosophy of sci-
ence; it seems to have been more or less Heisenberg’s preferred approach,
and has been advocated more recently by Peres (Peres 1993, pp.373–429,
Fuchs and Peres 2000). The ‘quantum Bayesianism’ or “QBism” of Fuchs
et al (Fuchs 2002; Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack 2014; Fuchs and Schack 2015)
has much in common with straight operationalism, although it holds out
for some objective physical description at a deeper level (see Timpson (2010, pp.188–235)
for a critique).
Complementarity: It is possible to describe a physical system at the micro-
scopic level, but the appropriate description depends on the experimental
context in question. Is an electron a wave or a particle? If you’re carrying
out a two-slit experiment, it’s a wave; if you change experimental context
to check which slit it went down, it’s a particle.
Niels Bohr is the most famous proponent of complementarity, though he
tended to describe it in qualitative terms and engaged little with mod-
ern (Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg-Dirac) quantum mechanics. Saunders (2005)
provides a rational reconstruction of complementarity in modern termi-
nology; the approaches of Omnes (1988, 1992, 1994) and Griffiths (1984,
1993, 1996) are very much in the spirit of complementarity.
But most relevant for our purposes is:
Measurement-induced collapse: The system can be described in microscopic
terms, and in a way independent of the measurement process: the physi-
cal quantities of the system are represented by the state, via the E-E link.
But at the final moment of measurement at the end of the experiment,
the Projection Postulate is applied, jumping the system into an eigenstate
of the quantity being measured.
Here we might seem to find a rehabilitation of orthodoxy. But consider: (i) as
we have seen, the E-E link in practice tells us nothing about the physical state
of the system between preparation and measurement, for it is almost certain
that the system is maximally indefinite with respect to any quantity of interest
pretty much throughout its evolution; (ii) collapse, occurring as it does at the
very end of the physical process described by the Lab View, can do no actual
work in physical predictions beyond what we already get from the Born rule.
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(As a terminological aside, although contemporary physics often uses “Copen-
hagen interpretation” to refer to measurement-induced collapse, the historical
views developed under that name are closer to complementarity and to straight
instrumentalism. See Cushing (1994) and Saunders (2005) for further discus-
sion.)
But in any case, the Lab View is itself insufficient to do justice to actual
applications of QM, once they transcend the prepare-evolve-measure framework
we have considered so far.
9 Limitations of the Lab View
We have already considered situations that go beyond what the Lab View,
strictly speaking, can handle: those when the measurement process is not the
end of our interaction with the system, where measurements are repeated or
continuous. Furthermore, and even outside these cases, the Lab View’s stipu-
lation that measurement is primitive is itself in conflict with physical practice:
measurement devices are physical systems, made from atoms and designed and
built on the assumption that their behaviour is governed by physical laws.
Which laws? Back in the glory days of the Copenhagen intepretation, per-
haps it was possible to suppose that the workings of lab equipment should be
analysed classically, but in these days of quantum optics, superconducting su-
percolliders and gravity-wave-sensitive laser interferometers, we cannot avoid
making extensive reference to quantum theory itself to model the workings of
our apparatus. And now a regress beckons: if we can understand quantum
theory only with respect to some experimental context, what is the context in
which we understand the application of quantum theory to the measurement
itself?
The method used is in each case the same (and we have already seen it play
out in our discussion of the projection postualte):
1. Insofar as the physics of the measurement process are relevant, we expand
the analysis to include the apparatus itself as part of the quantum system.
(In quantum information this move has come to be known as ‘the Church
of the Larger Hilbert Space’.)
2. We avoid infinite regress by treating the Born-Rule-derived probability
distribution over macroscopic degrees of freedom not as a probability of
getting certain values on measurement, but as a probability of certain
values already being possessed.
The need for an objective, non-quantum, macroscopically applicable lan-
guage to describe the physics of measurement was already recognised by Bohr
(and is acknowledged in more sophisticated operationalist accounts of quantum
theory; cf. Peres (1993, 423–427)). But it is really a special case of a more
general requirement, for modern applications of quantum mechanics go beyond
cases where measurement is repeated or continuous and embrace cases where we
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cannot really avoid interpreting the QM probabilities as entirely separate from
a formal ‘measurement’ process.
This is particularly clear in cosmology, where it has long been suggested that
Lab View quantum mechanics is unsuitable simply because cosmology concerns
the whole Universe, and so there is no ‘outside measurement context’; indeed,
it was for exactly these reasons that Hugh Everett developed his approach to
quantum theory in the first place (Everett 1957).
However, this slightly misidentifies the problem. Cosmology is concerned
with the Universe on its largest scales, but not with every last feature of the
Universe: realistic theories in cosmology concern particular degrees of freedom of
the universe (the distribution of galaxies, for instance) and we can perfectly well
treat these degrees of freedom as being measured via their interaction with other
degrees of freedom outside the scope of those theories (Fuchs and Peres 2000).
But there is a problem nonetheless. Namely: the processes studied in cos-
mology cannot, even in the loosest sense, be forced into the Lab View. They are
(treated as) objective, ongoing historical processes, tested indirectly via their
input into other processes; they are neither prepared in some state at the be-
ginning, nor measured at the end, and indeed in many cases they are ongoing.
Nor is the issue specific to cosmology. The luminosity of the Sun, for in-
stance, is determined in part via quantum mechanics: in particular, via the
quantum tunneling processes that control the rate of nuclear fusion in the Sun’s
core as a function of its mass and composition. We can model this fairly accu-
rately and, on the basis of that model, can deduce how the Sun’s luminosity has
increased over time. Astrophysicists pass that information to climate scientists,
geologists, and paleontologists, who feed it into their respective models of pre-
historic climates, geological processes, and ecosystems. All good science — but
only in the most Procrustean sense can we realistically regard a successful fit
to data in a paleoclimate model as being a measurement of the nuclear fusion
processes in the Sun a billion years ago.9
Issues of this kind abound whenever we apply quantum theory outside stylised
lab contexts. (Is the increased incidence of cancer due to Cold War nuclear-
weapons tests a quantum measurement of the decay processes in the fallout
products of those tests? Again, only in the most Procrustean sense.) In each
case we seem to have extracted objective facts about the unobserved world from
quantum theory, not merely to be dealing with a mysterious microworld that
gets its meaning only when observed. But they are particularly vivid in cos-
mology, which is a purely observational science, and a science chiefly concerned
not with repeating events in the present but with the historical evolution of the
observed Universe as a whole.
As perhaps the most dramatic example available — and probably the most
important application of quantum theory in contemporary cosmology — con-
sider the origin of structure in the Universe. Most of that story is classical:
we posit a very small amount of randomly-distributed inhomogeneity in the
9This is an instance of Quine’s classic objection to logical positivism (Quine 1951) — the
empirical predictions of particular applications of quantum mechanics cannot be isolated from
the influence of myriad other parts of our scientific world-view.
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very-early Universe, and then plug that into our cosmological models to de-
termine both the inhomogeneity in the cosmic microwave background and the
present-day distribution of galaxies. The latter, in particular, requires very ex-
tensive computer modelling that takes into account astrophysical phenomena on
a great many scales; it cannot except in the most indirect sense be regarded as a
‘measurement’ of primordial inhomogeneity. Quantum theory comes in as a pro-
posed source of the inhomogeneity: the posited scalar field (the ‘inflaton field’)
responsible for cosmic inflation is assumed to be in a simple quantum state in
the pre-inflationary Universe (most commonly the ground state) and quantum
fluctuations in that ground state, time-evolved through the inflationary era, are
identified with classical inhomogeneities. Quantum-mechanical predictions thus
play a role in our modelling of the Universe’s history, but not a role that the
Lab View seems remotely equipped to handle.
10 Quantum mechanics in practice: the deco-
herent view
Once again: the point is not that the orthodoxy of the Lab View is conceptually
inadequate, and so we must seek an unorthodox alternative; it is that physicists
manifestly are doing quantum mechanics in regimes beyond the reach of the
Lab View, so they must already have a method for applying it that goes beyond
the Lab View.
In fact, the method is fairly obvious. The probability distribution over cer-
tain degrees of freedom — solar energy density, radiation rate, modes of the
inflaton field — is simply treated as objective, as a probability distribution over
actually-existing facts, and not merely as something that is realised when an
experiment is performed. So we can say, for instance, not merely that a given
mode of the primordial inflaton field would have had probability such-and-such
of having a given amplitude if we were to measure it (whatever that means
operationally), but that it actually did have probability such-and-such of that
amplitude.
Now, it’s tempting to imagine extending this objective take on quantum
probabilities to all such probabilities: to interpret a quantum system as having
some objectively-possessed value of every observable, and the quantum state as
simply an economical way of coding a probability distribution over those ob-
servables. But of course, this cannot straightforwardly be done. A collection
of formal results — the Kochen-Specker theorem (Kochen and Specker 1967;
Bell 1966, Redhead 1987, pp.119–152, Mermin 1993); Gleason’s theorem (Gleason 1957,
Redhead 1987, pp.27–9, Peres 1993, pp.190–195 Caves et al 2004); the Bub-
Clifton theorem (Bub and Clifton 1996; Bub, Clifton, and Goldstein 2000); the
PBR theorem and its relatives (Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph 2011; Maroney 2012;
Leifer 2014)) — establish that reading quantum mechanics along these lines as
bearing the same relation to some underlying objective theory as classical sta-
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tistical mechanics bears to classical mechanics is pretty much10 impossible.
In fact, the central problem can be appreciated without getting into the
details of these results. To take an objective view of some physical quantity
is to suppose that the quantity has a definite value at each instant of time, so
that we can consider the various possible histories of that quantity (that is: the
various ways it can evolve over time) and assign probabilities to each. But the
phenomena of interference means that this does not generically work in quantum
mechanics. The quantum formalism for (say) the two slit experiment assigns
a well-defined probability P1(x) to the history where the particle goes through
Slit One and then hits some point x on the screen, and a similarly-well-defined
probability P2(x) to it hitting point x via Slit Two, but of course the probability
of it hitting point x at all (irrespectively of which slit it goes through) is not in
general P1(x) + P2(x). So the ‘probabilities’ assigned to these two histories do
not obey the probability calculus. And things that don’t obey the probability
calculus are not probabilities at all.
At a fundamental level, the problem is that quantum mechanics is a dy-
namical theory about amplitudes, not about probabilities. The amplitudes of
the two histories in the two-slit experiment sum perfectly happily to give the
amplitude of the particle reaching the slit, but amplitudes are not probabilities,
and in giving rise to probabilities they can cancel out or reinforce.
However, in most physical applications of quantum theory we are not work-
ing ‘at a fundamental level’, which is to say that we are not attempting the
usually-impossible task of deducing (far less interpreting) the evolution of the
full quantum state over time. Rather, we are interested in finding higher-level,
emergent dynamics, whereby we can write down dynamical equations for, and
make predictions about, certain degrees of freedom of a system without having
to keep track of all the remaining degrees of freedom. In the examples of the
previous section, for instance, we have considered:
• The robust relations between macrostates of measuring devices and states
of the system being measured, abstracting over the microscopic details of
the measuring devices
• The bulk thermal properties of the core of the Sun, abstracting over the
vast number of microstates compatible with those bulk thermal properties
• The low-wavelength modes of the inflaton field which are responsible for
primordial inhomogeneities, abstracting over the high-wavelength degrees
of freedom and the various other fields present.
In each case, we can derive from the quantum-mechanical dynamics an au-
tonomous system of dynamical equations for these degrees of freedom. In each
case, we can also derive from the Born Rule a time-dependent probability dis-
tribution over the values of those degrees of freedom. And in each case, that
10A more precise statement would be “impossible unless that underlying objective theory
has a number of extremely pathological-seeming features.” It is not universally accepted that
this rules out such theories, though; see, e. g. , Spekkens (2007) and Leifer (2014) for further
discussion.
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probability distribution defines a probability over histories that obeys the prob-
ability calculus. In each case, then, we are justified — at least formally, if
perhaps not philosophically — in studying the autonomous dynamical system
in question as telling us how these degrees of freedom are actually evolving,
quite independently of our measurement processes.
To put the position intentionally crudely: orthodox QM, I am suggesting,
consists of shifting between two different ways of understanding the quantum
state according to context: interpreting quantum mechanics realistically in con-
texts where interference matters, and probabilistically in contexts where it does
not. Obviously this is conceptually unsatisfactory (at least on any remotely
realist construal of QM) — it is more a description of a practice than it is a
stable interpretation. But why should that be surprising? Philosophers have
spent decades complaining that physicists’ approach to QM is philosophically
unsatisfactory, after all. In a way, philosophers’ version of ‘orthodoxy’ does
physicists too much credit in providing a self-consistent realist account of QM
that just lacks a satisfactory account of exactly when collapse happens, even
as it does them too little credit in failing to recognise the unsuitability of the
orthodox version of orthodoxy to physical practice.
And in fact, physics has made considerable progress in clarifying just when
we can, and cannot, get away with a probabilistic interpretation of the quan-
tum state, and in particular in helping us understand why we can reliably get
away with it in macroscopic contexts. The decoherence theory developed by,
inter alia, Joos and Zeh (Joos and Zeh 1985; Zeh 1993), Zurek (1991, 1998),
Gell-Mann and Hartle (1993), Omnes (1988, 1992), and Griffiths (1984, 1993)
in the 1980s and 1990s is concerned precisely with when the quantum state can
be treated as probabilistic, understood either (in the environment-induced deco-
herence framework of Joos, Zeh and Zurek) because interference is suppressed
with respect to some basis, or directly (in the consistent-histories framework
of Griffiths, Omnes, and Gell-Mann and Hartle) by finding a consistent rule
to assign probabilities to histories.11 Hence my name for this position: the
“decoherent view”.
And where is collapse in all this? Well, the condition of decoherence can
be reinterpreted as a condition for when we can impose an explicit collapse
rule without empirically contradicting quantum theory. But that ‘condition’
is precisely the condition in which we can get away with treating the quantum
state probabilistically, and from that perspective, “collapse” is just probabilistic
conditionalisation. Of course, we can continue to think of the quantum state
non-probabilistically, and use decoherence as a condition for when a physical
collapse process can be introduced, but now we are well outside the assess-
11Appreciating that this is the task being performed by decoherence in contemporary phys-
ical practice also goes some way to explaining why the physics community has regarded
decoherence as a major step towards understanding the interpretation of QM, something not
generally shared by philosophers.(Barrett (1999, p.230) is typical: “That decoherence destroys
simple interference effects does not solve the measurement problem since it does not explain
the determinateness of our measurement records . . . In order to observe a single determinate
record there must somewhere be a single determinate record.)
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ment of orthodoxy, and well along the path towards a proposed solution of the
measurement problem.
11 Two applications of the decoherent view
To illustrate the efficacy of the decoherent view in doing justice to physical
practice, I consider two examples, from radically different sectors of physics:
Stern-Gerlach type experiments, and the emergence of structure in the early
Universe from primordial fluctuations of the inflaton field.
The Stern-Gerlach-type experiments I have in mind proceed as follows:
1. A beam of silver atoms emerges from a furnace.
2. That beam is split by a magnetic field and the beam corresponding to spin
down in the z direction is discarded.
3. The beam is subjected to a series of interference experiments.
4. The spin of the atoms in the beam in (say) the x direction is measured by
once again splitting the beam and measuring what fraction of atoms are
in each beam.
Initially, the spin degrees of freedom of a silver atom is in a mixed state
ρ1 =
1
2
(|+z〉 〈+z|+ |−z〉 〈−z|). (33)
(The justification of this state comes from quantum statistical mechanics and
lies outside the scope of this paper.) After the magnetic field is applied, the
particles spin and position degrees of freedom become entangled, having state:
ρ2 =
1
2
(|+z〉 〈+z| ⊗ |ϕ+(t)〉 〈ϕ+(t)|+ |+z〉 〈+z| ⊗ |ϕ−(t)〉 〈ϕ−(t)|) (34)
where |ϕ+(t)〉 and |ϕ−(t)〉 are wavepacket states of negligible overlap. The
mixed state cannot be used for interference experiments, so we can get away
with treating it probabilistically. We now discard the − part of the beam, and
continue to operate only on the + part; conditional on the silver atom still
being in the apparatus, its spin state must be +z, and so we update the state
by conditionalising, to the pure state
|ψ3〉 = |+z〉⊗|ϕ+(t)〉 (35)
(A more realistic treatment might allow for slight overlap of wavepackets, so
that there is still some admixture of |−z〉.)
Now we do a series of interference experiments with the system. At this
point, treating it probabilistically will get us into trouble, so we avoid doing so:
we continue to evolve the state unitarily and abjure probabilistic conditionalis-
ing.
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Finally, we split the beam again, so it has form
|ψ4〉 = α+ |+z〉⊗|χ+(t)〉+ α− |−z〉⊗|χ−(t)〉 (36)
(with the values of α± depending on the details of the interference processes,
and with |χ+(t)〉 and |χ−(t)〉 again having negligible overlap. We once again
treat this probabilistically (since we are going to do no further interference ex-
periments, and indeed are about to entangle the system with a macroscopically
large measurement device) and interpret |α±|2 as the probability that the par-
ticle’s spin is in fact ±.
As for primordial structure formation, it works as follows (here I follow
Weinberg (2008, pp.470–474), and excerpt a more detailed discussion in Wallace (2016)).
A quantum field theory (the inflaton field) is coupled to spacetime geometry in
a perturbative fashion, and allowed to evolve in time. In the very early Universe
the system is inherently quantum-mechanical and the mod-squared amplitudes
of the various modes of the field cannot consistently be interpreted probabilisti-
cally. But as the universe expands, the various mechanisms of decoherence come
into play and — still very early in the Universe’s history — we reach the point
at which a probabilistic interpretation is consistent. At that point, we interpret
those mod-squared amplitudes as probabilities of the actual modes of the infla-
ton field having various values; this determines a probability distribution over
various possible inhomogeneities in the density of the early Universe, and that
distribution is fed into cosmological simulations of structure formation. There
is no measurement here, and no natural point for a collapse — only a quantum
state which, in due course, we can get away with treating probabilistically.
Thes examples probably strike the reader as uncomfortably opportunistic,
even ad hoc. Indeed, they should so strike the reader. The ad hoc, opportunistic
approach that physics takes to the interpretation of the quantum state, and the
lack, in physical practice, of a clear and unequivocal understanding of the state
— this is the quantum measurement problem, once the distractions of collapse
and the E-E link are removed.
12 Conclusion: the measurement problem from
the perspective of contemporary physics
Quantum mechanics, as actually practiced in mainstream physics, makes no use
of the eigenstate-eigenvector link, nor of the collapse postulate. Its dynamics
are unitary; the unitarily evolving quantum state is interpreted inchoately, as
describing physical goings on in regimes where interference is important and
as describing probabilities in regimes where it can be neglected. On pain of
failure to account for interference, we cannot (it seems) consistently treat the
state as probabilistic; on pain of failure to account for the probability rule, and
more generally of failing to make contact with observation, we cannot (it seems)
consistently treat the state as representational. The “measurement problem”
from this perspective, is the task of taking this inchoate practice and showing
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how it can be justified given, as starting point, a well-defined physical theory
— where what counts as a “well-defined physical theory” will depend on one’s
general stance on scientific realism and the philosophy of science. Perhaps we
can do so by showing how an ultimately physical superposition nonetheless
appears emergently probabilistic (Everett’s strategy); perhaps we can do so
by showing that interference can after all be made sense of on probabilistic
grounds (the quantum Bayesian strategy, and the ψ-epistemic one); perhaps
we can do so by adding additional representational structure (the Bohmian
strategy) or by changing the dynamics to introduce a stochastic element (the
dynamical-collapse strategy) or by adopting a conception of scientific theories
that diverges from standard realism (the complementarity, quantum-logic, and
instrumentalist strategies; perhaps the quantum-Bayesian strategy too).
From this perspective, the distinction between ‘pure interpretations’ that
leave the formalism of QM alone, and modificatory strategies that modify or sup-
plement it, is clear. The (real) Copenhagen interpretation, quantum Bayesian-
ism, and the Everett interpretation (whatever their strengths or weaknesses
otherwise) fall into the former category, as would a (hypothethical) ψ-epistemic
interpretation: their dynamics is unitary throughout, their formalism unsupple-
mented by hidden variables. Dynamical-collapse and hidden-variable theories
are in the latter category, being committed to adding additional variables and/or
to modifying the Schro¨dinger equation.
From this perspective, too, the “orthodox interpretation” — that is, the
theory obtained by adding the E-E link and the projection postulate to unitary
quantum mechanics, and deriving the Born rule from them — is just one more
modificatory strategy, and a strikingly implausible and unattractive one to boot.
Perhaps some better attempt to solve the measurement problem will incorporate
one or both, perhaps in modified and improved form — but it is time to retire
the theory that is based on them as a starting point for discussions of the
measurement problem.
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